(millat) as well as the inalienable Rights of Man and of Private Property; and in the official conception of the social order -from an hierarchical and patrimonial system to a supposedly democratic and egalitarian system where all Muslims, irrespective of birth, enjoyed in theory open access to positions of authority. Finally, the constitutional revolution was a true revolution in that it introduced a new regime rather than rebuilt the old regime. Of course, many of the participants denied that they intended to introduce a new order, and sincerely believed that they were revitalizing and reforming the old order. But, in the same way as the French Convention draped itself as the Roman Republic and the English Puritans considered themselves as free Anglo-Saxons overthrowing the Norman Yoke, so the Iranian revolutionaries thought that they were returning to ancient traditions whereas, in fact, they were introducing something new and unknown in their society -a statewide political movement that demanded an elected National Assembly to limit the authority of the traditional Shah-an-Shahs. They frequently referred to the teachings of Imams 'Ali, Hussein, and Hassan; but not a single one of these Shi'i Imams had ever spoken of elected National Assemblies.
In the words of Marx:
The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. And just when men seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves and things, in creating something that has never yet existed, precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle cries and costumes in order to present the new scene in this time-honored disguise and this borrowed language.30
EARLY NINETEENTH-CENTURY IRAN
Social scientists have used the term 'class' in at least two different ways: first, as a sociological category to rank individuals with similar sources of income, similar degrees of influence, and similar styles of life; second, as a sociopsychological term to classify individuals who share not only parallel positions in the social hierarchy, but also similar economic, cultural, and political attitudes. Marx described the first as a class 'in itself' but not yet 'for itself'; the second as a class 'for itself' as well as 'in itself.'31 Similarly, modern sociologists have contrasted socioeconomic, latent, and objective classes with sociopolitical, manifest, and subjective classes.32 Classes in the former sense of the word obviously exist, to various degrees, in all societies; but classes in the latter sense of the word do not necessarily exist in all societies.
In early nineteenth-century Iran, classes existed in the first, but not in the second, meaning of the term.33 The population, which totaled no more than five 30 The second major class, the propertied middle class, included urban merchants (tujjiar), small landowners (malek), as well as bazaar shopkeepers and workshop owners (pishevaran). Since businessmen, tradesmen, and craftsmen financed the bazaar mosques, schools (maktabs), seminaries (madresehs), theaters (takiyas), and other religious foundations (vaqfs), the propertied middle class was intricately connected to the clergy ('ulama') -to the various preachers (va'ez), Koranic teachers (akhunds), seminary students (tullabs), low-ranking clerics (mullas), and even high-ranking theologians (mujtaheds). Moreover, some members of the bazaar population claimed to be descendants of the prophet (sayyids).
The third class was formed of urban wage-earners, such as hired artisans, apprentices, journeymen, household servants, porters, laborers, and building workers. Finally, the fourth major class consisted of the vast majority of the rural population (ri'yat) -the tribal masses (iliyoiti) as well as the landless and near landless peasantry (dehqfanan).
These four, however, were only latent, objective, and sociological classes. They failed to develop into manifest, subjective, and sociopsychological classes because of the predominance of local communal ties based on tribal lineages, religious sects, linguistic sentiments, and paternalistic affiliations. Cutting through the socioeconomic lines, the communal ties fragmented the horizontal strata, strengthened the vertical bonds, and, thereby, hindered the development of self-conscious sociopolitical classes. To paraphrase Marx, insofar as numerous individuals shared similar ways of life, similar positions in the mode of production, and similar relations to the means of administration, they constituted socioeconomic classes. But insofar as these individuals were bound by local ties, Social barriers were complicated by religious cleavages, which in some areas reinforced existing communal differences, while in others they caused new ones. The country's population was obviously divided into a Shi'i majority, a Sunni minority formed of Kurds, Turkomans, Arabs, and Baluchis, and a non- These communal barriers were further reinforced by social organizations. Each tribe, each village, each town ward, had its own separate and hierarchical structure. At the apex were the landed magnates -the tribal chiefs, and major fiefholders, and the urban notables. At the base were the common people -the peasants, the nomads, and the town inhabitants. In between were layers of intermediaries, the most important of whom, throughout the country, were the village, tribal, ward, and guild, kadkhudds (headmen). These kadkhudas, drawn invariably from the medium-incomed families, were often elected to their posts by the local communities. As headmen, they carried out two major functions: they mediated disputes between members of their own community; and they represented their own community in its dealings with the outside world -whether with the state, especially in the collection of taxes, or with the neighboring communities, particularly in the periodic disputes over adjacent lands, water rights, and tax assessments. Because of these frequent disputes, kadkhudas and influential landowners acted as patrons, defending their own community against other communities. The essence of this patriarchal system was summed up by an old Persian proverb, 'A man without a protector is like a dog howling in the wilderness. ' These communal divisions, by fragmenting the population into small selfcontained units, not only prevented the development of social classes but also permitted the Qajar shahs to dominate the country in the manner of typical 'oriental despots.' In the words of an observant European visitor, the monarchs 'ensured their own safety' by continually 'fomenting' and 'nicely balancing the existing mutual jealousies.'37 As Ann Lambton has appropriately stated, the ruling kings systematically manipulated the 'constitutional inability' of the landlords to combine and adopted the 'perpetuation of tribal feuds' as 'instru-ments of state policy.'38 Moreover, they consciously exploited the sectarian conflicts in the towns to weaken potential challenges from the urban populations. As one British traveler remarked, Iranian cities, unlike medieval European cities, were so sharply factionalized into rival wards that they were incapable of resisting the central government.39 To paraphrase Marx, the Qajar 'despots' manipulated the small communities -'the little stereotype of social organisms' -and, thus, 'stood over,' 'poised above,' and 'symbolized' the unity of all the lesser communities:
The despot here appears as the father of all the numerous lesser communities, thus realizing the common unity of all. It therefore follows that the surplus product belongs to this highest unity. Oriental despotism therefore appears to lead to a legal absence of property. In fact, however, its foundation is tribal or common property, in most cases created through a combination of manufacture and agriculture within the small community which thus becomes entirely self-sustaining and contains within itself all conditions of production and surplus production. The Western challenge and the Qajar response created two significant structural changes within Iranian society. On the one hand, the influx of massmanufactured goods, the commercialization of agriculture, the introduction of modern communications (especially the telegraph), and the sale of monopolies to foreign concession-hunters coalesced the many regional bazaars into a crossregional middle class conscious for the first time of its state-wide interests and its foreign competitors. The bourgeoisie become a sociopsychological class as well as a socioeconomic class, a class 'for itself' as well as 'in itself.' On the other hand, the opening of secular educational institutions, the expansion of the central administration, and the training of new civil servants, army officers, and technical professionals, created a small but vital salaried middle class. This class later became known as the modern intelligentsia (munaver al-fekr).
THE BOURGEOISIE
The local bazaars were transformed into a national middle class in a number of ways. First, the integration of the regional markets into a national market and the national market into the international market dissolved the relatively self-sufficient units into one major statewide economic unit. Second, the introduction of modern communications bridged the geographical distances, and, thereby, brought the various urban centers closer together. Third, the beginnings of a modern state, especially the establishment of a central mint, of government newspapers, and of a cabinet system, focused the attention of the provincial towns onto the national capital. Fourth, the influx of mass-manufactured products undermined the traditional handicrafts, and, consequently, presented for the different bazaars a mutual enemy, the foreign competitor. As one tax collector reported in a detailed study of the commercial crisis in Isfahan: In the past, good-quality textiles were manufactured in Isfahan since everyone -from the highest to the lowest -wore local products. But in the last few years, the people have given up their body and soul to buy the colorful and low-quality, but cheap, products of Europe. In doing so, they have incurred greater losses than they imagined: local weavers, in imitating foreign fabrics, have lowered their quality; Russians have stopped buying Iranian textiles; and many occupations have suffered great losses. At least one-tenth of the guilds in this city were weavers; not even one-fifth has survived. About one-twentieth of the needy widows lived by spinning for the weavers. Many of the problems facing the propertied middle class can be seen in a report sent to Naser al-Din Shah in I882 by a government official from the port of Bushire on the Persian Gulf.48 Having describe the recent growth of Bushire, the official explained that the boom had not benefited the Iranian merchants because, unlike their British competitors, they were handicapped by government neglect, by lack of storage depots and modern steamboats, and by higher taxes, import duties, and road tolls. The report warned that the local merchants had the choice of either going bankrupt or buying British citizenship. On the back of the report, Naser al-Din Shah criticized the merchants for their 'selfishness' and praised the official for his 'interesting observation,' but failed typically to initiate any government remedies. We have found that ideas which were by no means acceptable when coming from your agents in Europe were accepted at once with greatest delight when it was proved that they were latent in Islam. I can assure you that the little progress which you see in Persia and T'urkey, especially in Persia, is due to this fact that some people have taken your European principles and instead of saying that they came from England, France, or Germany, they have said, 'We have nothing to do with Europeans; but these are the true principles of our religion (:,nd indeed, this is quite true) which have been taken by Europeans !' That has had a marvelous effect at once. It is clear enough that the concessionnaire will commence the work with a small capital and will purchase the tobacco from the cultivators and sell it to the merchants and manufacturers for higher prices, and all the profits will remain in the purse of the English. As the Persian merchants have no right to export tobacco from Persia, those who were formerly engaged in the trade will be obliged to give up their business and find some other work. The concession does not take into account how many merchants who were enaged in this business will be left without employment ....57
The arrival of the company agents in Shiraz, the main tobacco region, was promptly met with a local strike. The local strike rapidly spread, thanks to the Although the ideological impact of the West has been grossly overestimated, the socioeconomic impact of the West can be described as the major determining cause of the constitutional revolution. For the economic penetration of Iran integrated the many regional economies into one national economy; the formation of the national economy gradually alleviated the traditional conflicts among the various urban communities, especially between Shaykhi and Mutashar'i craftsmen, between Haydari and Ni'mati traders, and among Tehrani, Tabrizi, Isfahani, Qazvini, and Shirazi merchants; the alleviation of communal conflicts, helped create a propertied middle class; the propertied middle class, threatened by foreign competitors and local compradors, became a discontented national bourgeoisie, aware of both its own strengths and the weaknesses of the ruling dynasty; and the discontented national bourgeoisie, encouraged by the traditional antistate sentiments of the Shi'i 'ulami', developed into a revolutionary class. Economic changes had caused social changes; social changes, in turn, had led to political changes. To paraphrase Marx, it was not the introduction of revolutionary consciousness that created the new social order; but, on the contrary, it was the existence of the new social order that permitted the adaption of selective aspects from the modern revolutionary consciousness.
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